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Abstract
That global climate is being altered by human activities is well-established; for specific locations,
however, the details of how and when many aspects of the changes will become manifest remains
somewhat uncertain. For many policy makers there is a gap between recognising a long-term
change and implementing short-term practical responses; therefore many countries are failing to
implement changes needed for long-term adaptation. Traditional planning approaches are often
closely aligned with near- term political cycles and perform poorly in terms of prioritising
interventions that address multi-decadal climate impacts. We propose a novel approach that builds
on adaptive planning and lessons from the business sector. The Future-Climate, Current-Policy
(FCCP) Framework is based on plausible medium-term future climate scenarios, linked
‘backwards’ to identify short-term ‘no regrets’ actions. The approach was designed by a team of
climate scientists and policy practitioners in East Africa and tested in national and regional fora.
Initial trials of the FCCP Framework has proved it to be popular and effective as a way of linking
climate science with policy. Its use shows promise as a way of initiating discussions that can enable
long-term climate change information to feed effectively into the policy and planning process.
1. Introduction
That global climate is being altered by human activ-
ities is well-established; for specific regions, how-
ever, the details of how and when many aspects of
the changes will become manifest remains somewhat
uncertain. This change is also happening at a time
whenmany countries are undergoing rapid economic
and demographic change. In 2015, the world com-
mitted to an ambitious set of development targets,
the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs). The SDGs acknowledge that development is
complex and multi-faceted, and in setting out a wide
ranging and extensive framework they draw atten-
tion to the scale of the task. The SDGs also have a
time horizon of 15 years (2015 to 2030), a period
of time during which the impacts of climate change
are expected to be significant. Many countries have
tailored their national development programmes to
address some or all of the pressing issues expressed
∗
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in the SDGs, and in many cases a general recogni-
tion of the challenges associated with climate change
is included. However, specific commitments designed
to both mitigate and adapt to the effects of climate
change are often absent, unclear, or are not backed by
commensurate institutional capacity, resources and
coordination (Antwi-Agyei et al 2018, England et al
2018). There has been a long history of international
and national commitments to general principles, but
what is often lacking is clear guidance that can be
acted upon by policy makers and practitioners on the
ground (see for example Dessai et al 2005).
It is undoubtedly difficult for national and local
governments to adequately prepare for long-term
changewhile facing significant short-term challenges.
The gap between recognising a long-term change and
implementing short-term practical responses appears
to be hard to bridge (Climate and Development
Knowledge Network 2012). Some studies suggest that
this disconnect is at least partly a problem of time
scales. Policy responses to climate change are needed
that will be resilient and appropriate in the long term,
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by IOP Publishing Ltd
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and that can respond well under a range of possible
future scenarios, while policy is generally made in
political and technical institutions that run on much
shorter time horizons; five-year election cycles or
even annual budgeting cycles. There is strong evid-
ence that political imperatives have often led to defer-
ral of urgent and difficult decisions, often for dec-
ades. There is also evidence that the nature of the
uncertainty in climate science is poorly understood by
policy makers. While many or most decision makers
are aware that the climate is changing, non climate-
specialists are often unaware of the extent to which
the direction or scale of change is known or can be
predicted with a reasonable degree of confidence. As
a result, they are often challenged in identifying pri-
ority actions and critical changes. Finally, the pressing
need to address short-term priority needs can ‘crowd
out’ strategic changes designed to secure long-term
resilience.
In this letter we propose one approach for
bridging this gap and facilitating a policy discourse
between those involved in climate science and those
involved in policy making. In this short letter we
demonstrate its use in the Greater Horn of Africa
(GHA) region, as an example, and explore its poten-
tial to be further developed and tested. This new
approach is being used in the mapping of climate ser-
vices deliverables on long-term national development
policy targets (e.g. NDPII 2015) in the GHA region
and beyond.
2. Background (planning experiences)
Development is complicated. National and local gov-
ernments face well-documented challenges to balance
competing and urgent development needs, and this is
exacerbated in rapidly growing economies with a low
tax base, where public funding is scarce. Long-term
changes in the climate present additional challenges.
For resilience, policy must be developed that delivers
good outcomes both in the short term and into the
future, even though the nature of the changing cli-
mate means that there are a number of different pos-
sible future scenarios.
Traditional public sector planning, by contrast,
tends to be incremental and conservative. It is often
based upon annual budgetary cycles managed at the
intersection of the political and the executive arms of
government. In many countries in the GHA, the pro-
cess is modelled on the Westminster system, wherein
sector ministries and departments must compete for
funding allocations from the Ministry of Finance.
Budgeting is often driven from the bottom up—
with local offices and departments preparing annual
budgets that are then included in the national level
request for funding. Despite recent decentralisation,
evidence suggests that responsive local budgeting that
engages effectively with local community needs and
opinions remains elusive (see for example Tidemand
2009, Tsofa et al 2017). To a large extent, budget
allocations and plans remain highly influenced by
competing political interests at higher levels of
government.
Furthermore, when resources are scarce, the total
budget requested is rarely forthcoming and often
delivered late in the financial year. This has two
effects. The first is to encourage unrealistic requests
for funding, in the hope that a ‘reduced’ allocation
will still be sufficient to deliver the planned pro-
gramme. The second effect is to reduce the efficacy of
funding as a whole becausewhere part of the budget is
allocated and disbursed late funds may either remain
unspent or are spent on high cost items outside of the
original plan, to ensure utilisation before the end of
the funding cycle. This tendency for budget alloca-
tions to be released late also has the effect of focusing
spending at the start of the financial year on ‘contrac-
ted’ obligations such as salaries and utilities, because
these must be paid even if the overall budget is never
honoured. Many observers note that the net effect of
this, and other structural constraints in government,
is to encourage ‘planning to budget’ to the detriment
of long-term strategic change. In urban water and
sanitation, for example, constraints in planning and
budgeting limit the ability of departments to invest in
re-engineering water or sanitation systems to deliver
resilient services, because this would require reliable
multi-year financial planning and operational trans-
formation that cannot be funded from sporadic unre-
liable annual allocations. Limitations in the planning
and budgeting system thus constrain the potential to
drive the sort of systemic changes needed to tackle cli-
mate change.
In response to the well documented limitations
of conventional planning many commentators have
proposed a more adaptive approach to planning,
recognising that decisions made today may have
unexpected consequences tomorrow, and that there
are significant interdependencies between decisions
made in a range of sectors. A range of adaptive plan-
ning tools and approaches have been developedmany
of which have been applied to the sphere of natural
resources (see for example Alterman 1988, Kato and
Ahern 2008, Poff et al 2016). Adaptive planning is well
established and widely used particularly in the private
and third sectors. While governments often play lip
service there is little evidence of their adopting true
adaptive planning in practice. A significant body of
work provides useful frameworks that can be used
or modified and there are well documented cases of
these being applied to climate change. However, while
adaptive planning is undoubtedly important and use-
ful it has three potential flaws that have been found in
some cases to limit its applicability in the early phases
of climate-responsive policy planning.
The first is that it is complicated; adaptive
planning frameworks by definition are complex
and require a sophisticated understanding of path
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dependency and interdependency. Non-specialists
may struggle to engage with the process in the early
stages; where multiple stakeholders need to particip-
ate the twin paths of adaptive planning and negoti-
ation may prove so complex that the result is para-
lysis and no action. Chaudhury et al (2012) note for
example the challenge of engaging sufficient stake-
holders in an effective way.
The second is that it remains difficult to link long-
term future-facing climate data to practical policy
decisions. Many sector planners are familiar with his-
toric data (for example, engineers use historic rain-
fall and flooding data to design stormwater infra-
structure) which has high specificity and accuracy.
Nissan et al (2019) noted that ‘multidecadal climate
change projections, while essential for informingmit-
igation policy, do not target the appropriate times-
cale needed for the majority of adaptation decisions
…’. This mismatch between the available forward-
looking data and traditional planning approaches cre-
ates a mismatch and renders it challenging to plan for
building resilience into the future.
The final problem lies with human nature. Plan-
ning processes that start from the present and work
forward risk capture by stakeholders whose incentives
(conscious or unconscious) is to reinforce their cur-
rent behaviours. Climate change calls for a new way
of working and requires a planning approach that can
place adequate priority on to long-term goals.
In summary, the anticipated threat of climate
change introduces a tension between the need to
achieve long-term, large-scale change under condi-
tions of uncertainty and the needs of short-term
decision makers to meet budgetary planning cycles
with a focus on current staffing and ongoing oper-
ational management. The tendency is thus for long-
term planning to be subsumed under pressing every-
day needs.
A proven, but under-utilized, approach to ensure
near-term decisions are also advancing long-term
interests is to explicitly ‘work backwards’ from the
long-term goal to the near-term decision. The idea
of ‘working backwards’, from impact towards action,
has long been recognised as an important concept
both in the development literature and in the cli-
mate change literature, where it is often referred to
as ‘back-casting’ (see for example Vervoort 2013).
In development literature and practice, the idea is
embedded in the use of logical frameworks (often
known as ‘logframes’). The logframe process starts
with a discussion to define the anticipated or desired
impact of an intervention. Subsequently, those plan-
ning the intervention walk ‘backwards’ from the
desired impact, first towards the project outcomes
needed to achieve the intended impact, then to the
corresponding outputs required to produce those
outcomes. The final step is to identify the inputs
needed to produce these outputs. Logframes, and the
related ‘theory of change’ approach, thus enable a
linking between immediate action and later effects.
They are not, however, widely used outside of project
and programme settings where their use is widely
promoted by bilateral and multilateral agencies and
international non-governmental organisations. Fur-
thermore, logframes are often constrained as project
planning tools, because the general themes of planned
activities are known in advance, and the ultimate
impact is defined by the funding agency.
Both adaptive planning and logical frameworks
have also informed and drawn from another planning
strand, from the business literature. Businesses often
use variations on an integrated planning cycle that
links a long-term (i.e. ten years) planning forecast to
amedium-term (i.e. three year) requirement for ‘cap-
ability development’ and short-term (i.e. one year)
‘breakthrough’ projects. Short-term projects can thus
be placed in a 10-3-1 framework that calls for them to
be both achievable but also aspirational and geared
to address long-term change. This long-established
approach has been used to ‘legitimise’ short-term
innovation because it creates explicit links to as yet
unrealised future changes (Earl et al 1995). This idea
has been amplified, with an explicit recognition of
the uncertainty in future scenarios by, for example,
Sharpe et al (2016), who use ‘three horizons’ to frame
a range of possible futures as the basis for planning.
A combination of scenario development and ‘back-
casting’ has proved successful in several development
sectors, for example, for assessing the effect of imple-
menting the Water Framework Directive in Europe
(Kok et al 2011).
The question is can we use this combined exper-
ience from the development and business world to
find a way to link changes needed in the distant future
with concrete action today and to kick start more
informed policy-focused discussions about policy
priorities that would enable the participation of both
climate scientists and policy specialists?
3. The Future-Climate, Current-Policy
(FCCP) framework
Our approach has drawn on all these strands but we
have aimed to simplify them sufficiently to engage
key stakeholders in a rapid and comprehensible pro-
cess. Our aim has been to develop an approach that
is: sufficiently grounded and detailed to generate real-
istic draft plans; focused on the generation of a set
of achievable but challenging short-term actions; and
also geared to address long-term change. The result-
ant ‘Future-Climate, Current-Policy (FCCP) Frame-
work’ enables a flexible debate that anchors proposed
actions to an analysis of whether they are likely to res-
ult in outcomes that mitigate future climate change
impacts. We use the example of East Africa to illus-
trate the implementation and testing of this approach.
Over five years the authors have engaged in the
HyCRISTAL collaboration, which aims to generate
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new climate science for East Africa focused around
the Lake Victoria Basin specifically on a 40-year time
horizon (Marsham et al 2015). There is an explicit
recognition of the need to create a link between the
generation of new climate science and policy change
on the ground. A series of meetings were held that
brought together leading climate scientists and sec-
toral policy makers, in the fields of water manage-
ment, urban infrastructure, agriculture and rural live-
lihoods, tea production, transport and fisheries in
East Africa. Policy makers and development practi-
tioners in the region understand the ‘idea of climate
change’, but are often unable to relate it to immediate
policy choices. This appears to be because the longer
timehorizons of climate change outstrip regular plan-
ning cycles.
For example, if we know that in forty years’ time
inland freshwater lake temperatures are likely to rise,
we can understand that this is likely to have an effect
on current fish stocks. Critical changes to the intens-
ity and pattern of rainfall are a likely result, poten-
tially affecting lake visibility, so that Nile Perch, for
example, may no longer be a viable crop, that means
that many people who currently make a living from
Perch fisheries will no longer be able to do so. How-
ever we also know that the details of what will happen
are not precisely known—and this, coupled with the
long time frame, can make the problem seem over-
whelming. There is no obvious answer to the ques-
tion, what should we do about this pressing future
problem today?
Two innovations attempt to bridge this gap
between the science of medium-term (40 years)
change and short-termplanning. Firstly, Climate Risk
Narratives (CRNs) are used to reduce the complex
multi-dimensional nature of the climate model pro-
jection data to three plausible quasi-quantitative cli-
mate scenarios (Jack et al 2019, Burgin et al 2020).
They are based on a synthesis of the most up to
date climate information with a specific focus on
communicating critical messages to audiences with
different levels of climate science capacity (Burgin
et al 2019a,b). More sophisticated and established
scenario planning approaches, e.g. the 2 × 2 scen-
ario method, are well adapted to later stages of the
planning process, but are noted for their complexity
(Ramirez and Wilkinson 2013). In contrast, the Cli-
mate Risk Narratives are less complex, using potential
climate futures to support the early stages of policy
planning.
In East Africa, Burgin et al’s (2020) three CRNs
are used to frame the policy discussion. These broadly
span the range of climatemodel outputs, highlighting
the primary areas of risk and uncertainty, and ensur-
ing internal physical consistency within each narrat-
ive. Individually, each CRN is posed deterministic-
ally, but collectively they give a sense of the prediction
uncertainty, with headlines as follows:
CRN1—Much wetter seasons, large increase in
extreme rainfall events, and hotter.
CRN2—Increase in extreme rainfall events, and
hotter.
CRN3—Much hotter and drier with more erratic
rainy seasons.
Secondly, we develop the FCCP Framework, that
utilises these CRNs to support planning that is
responsive to climate change. The overall approach
of FCCP is based on the idea of articulating a desir-
able outcome on the medium-term (40 year) time
horizon and working back from that point to identify
short-term (1 to 5 year) actions. A forty-year vision is
potentially extremely extensive, so to ensure that the
results are practical and achievable the FCCP Frame-
work focuses on the likely set of impacts of future cli-
mate change on specific sectors (for example fisheries,
infrastructure, water etc) with a particular focus on
the most vulnerable people who are likely to exper-
ience the most serious impacts. While these impacts
may be both positive and negative, the focus tends to
be on the negative impacts as these are the ones that
primarily need to be the focus of both adaptation and
mitigation. In a given sector the likely effects of cli-
mate change can be identified for all three CRNs on
a 40 year time horizon. The resulting set of poten-
tial impacts can then be used to identify a parallel
set of desirable outcomes in the same time horizon
(also 40 years).—These outcomes can be thought of
as the inverse of the negative impacts—for example,
reductions or elimination of any anticipated negat-
ive impact. The result is a forty-year ‘target’ for the
sector in question. This in turn forms the basis for a
planning discussion working back from the forty year
time horizon towards the development of 1 to 5 year
action plans.
The detailed steps are given in Box 1 and a schem-
atic of the approach in figure 1.
Box 1; The FCCP Framework
1. Select one possible 40-year CRN
2. Identify the set of negative impacts of this
CRN on a specific sector (for example all
relating to agriculture, or water). Some
positive impacts may also be identified at
this step.
3. Identify a set of outcomes that would need
to be achieved by 40 years from now, in
order for these negative impacts to be mit-
igated or avoided through adaptation. This
becomes the 40-year policy ‘target’ that can
now form the basis for a discussion about
priority policy changes.
4. To link this with the present the first step is
to ask, if this is the outcome that we need
to achieve in 40 years, what outcome do
4
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Figure 1. The FCCP Framework Approach to Planning and Monitoring. Climate effects under a given climate future, in a given
sector, along with their impacts are identified first. The 40-year outcome is developed next—this is the desired effect of policy
changes made in the short-term which would offset, reduce or eliminate any anticipated long-term negative climate-related
impacts. 20- and 10-year outcomes are those that need to be achieved to secure the desired 40-year outcome. 5-year and
immediate actions are those needed to achieve the required 10-year outcome.
we need to have achieved by 20 years from
now?
5. The next step is to ask, if this is the out-
come that we need to achieve in 20 years
what do we need to have achieved 10 years
from now?
6. Ten years is an easier target to visualise, and
it is now possible to ask, if this is what we
want to achieve in ten years what do we
need to be doing five years from now.
7. And if we need to be doing certain things
five years from now what do we need to be
doing today?
8. A final step for this FCCP is then to askwho
needs to be doing these things and what
resources are needed?
The process can be repeated for a range of
possible futures and a range of potential impacts.
The combined results provide a long list of pri-
ority actions for today that provide protection
in face of diverse future climate risks that are
needed irrespective of which climate futures occur
and some of which can be delivered with poten-
tial impact acrossmultiple sectors. These outputs
in turn can be used to map out actions that can
be incorporated into national and local develop-
ment plans as well as annual budget planning.
4. Testing the FCCP framework
The FCCP Framework was first tested at an inter-
disciplinary meeting in Kampala, Uganda in April
2018. A total of 50 people participated in the pro-
cess, including climate scientists and sector specialists
from Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and Ethiopia. FCCP
Frameworks were developed for a variety of sectors
and for each of the three possible climate narratives.
An example of one output from this process is shown
below in figure 2. Note that the entries under ‘Actions
Now’ are brief summaries of a rich and wide ranging
discussion.
The participants were drawn from a wide range
of sectors and the process resulted in very detailed
and ambitious plans and stimulated a well-informed
debate about future action. The immediate and five
year action plans were characterised as being both
realistic and ambitious and in most cases represen-
ted a challenge to embedded current practices (for
example the need to reorient teaching curricula).
There was a strong emphasis on the need for gen-
erating improved systems of data collection so that
future investments can be more responsive. A com-
mon theme was the need to transform professional
training so that it focuses on building capacity to solve
problems rather than focusing on the transference of
information. This was seen to be critical in recogni-
tion of the fact that the context in which most policy
makers work will be dynamic and rapidly changing
over the coming decades.
An example of the power of the approach can be
seen under the 40-year outcomes in figure 2 where
one of the outcomes is listed as ‘Drainage is sized for
new peak flood events’. To achieve this outcome—
where drains would be appropriately sized for appro-
priate design events—a number of outcomes are
mapped out for earlier periods including investment
in soft infrastructure to attenuate peak flood events,
implementation of active management of drainage
including training and funding for excellence in oper-
ations and maintenance, and modifications to build-
ing codes. The objective at forty years is achieved
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Figure 2. FCCP Framework for health services and sanitation infrastructure in a hotter, wetter climate. The framework is
completed from right to left. The forty-year outcome is the target that needs to be achieved to offset anticipated negative climate
effects and impacts. To achieve this the twenty- and ten-year policy outcomes have been identified. To achieve the ten-year
outcome, five year and immediate actions have then been identified.
through a combination of interventions that can all be
tracked back to immediate five-year actions around
budget allocations, awareness raising and training.
The implication is that in forty years, drainage pro-
fessionals will need to be thinking about drainage in
a way that is transformed when compared to today.
While the Uganda workshop proved the value of
the FCCP Framework in the abstract, it was far from
a genuine policy making meeting—limited conclu-
sions could be drawn about the usefulness of the
approach when it is implemented in a planning arena
where stakeholders do not have a central stake in the
resource implications of the derived plans.
To address this shortcoming and engage more
active stakeholders, the FCCP Framework was sub-
sequently used to advance user engagement at the
August 2018 Greater Horn of Africa Climate Out-
look Forum (GHACOF). This long-standing tri-
annual activity, coordinated by the IGAD (Intergov-
ernmental Authority on Drought and Development)
Climate Prediction andApplicationsCentre (ICPAC),
has until recently focussed exclusively on seasonal
prediction, but now aspires to include climate change
information. These regular interdisciplinary fora
bring together scientists working in weather and
climate and sectoral specialists (from agriculture,
food security, livestock, water, energy, health, con-
flict warning, media) to prepare a consensus cli-
mate outlook, discuss likely impacts, and prepare
strategies for resilience. In August 2018, a capacity
building event—‘Climate Change Perspectives’—was
held with representatives of national meteorological
and hydrological services from the ten regional IGAD
member countries. The event comprised three inter-
related components: CRN development training,
FCCPFramework development training, and deliber-
ations on future applications of the CRNs and FCCPs.
The full report for the event is available from the
authors. Participantswere divided into three breakout
groups: Northern (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, South
Sudan and Sudan), Equatorial (Kenya, Somalia and
Uganda) and Southern (Burundi, Rwanda and Tan-
zania), with an example of one output shown in table
1. A similar capacity building event was also held with
GHACOF stakeholders in November 2018. In this
case participants were divided based on user sectors
(agriculture, water and energy) instead of geographic
regions.
Feedback was elicited from participants at all
three meetings. We used online follow up by email
and a simple survey questionnaire. Participants were
asked to reflect on their experience of using the FCCP
and to comment on its usefulness as a prelimin-
ary planning tool. We also gathered feedback from
the facilitators at all three meetings. In this case, we
carried out unstructured interviews to garner their
reflections. A total of over sixty participants provided
their feedback.
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The backward future-to-present planning process
proved challenging for some. A few groups preferred
to move directly from agreeing on the 40-year out-
come to discussing actions needed now, and com-
plete the action and outcome gaps for 5, 10 and
20 years ahead subsequently. However, when review-
ing the outputs from the process, it was apparent
that this approach does indeed risk locking in exist-
ing short-term planning choices (see ‘background’
above). When facilitators reiterated the motivation
for working back in time at every step the groups were
able to challenge some of their preconceptions about
priority actions.
The feedback on the FCCP Framework approach
at both of these GHACOF events can be summarized
as follows.
• The FCCP Framework is a powerful approach
to setting out the challenge of implementing cli-
mate information as an easy-to-conceptualize time
sequence of adaptation and mitigation actions.
• The FCCP Framework minimizes, or altogether
removes, the long-standing challenge of reconcil-
ing immediate adaptation actions with long-term
developmental targets and visions.
Participants also expressed a strong desire to
adopt the FCCP Framework approach to help inspire
and formulate the following interrelated activities:
• Synthesis of climate projection information with
user needs, in partnership with national and inter-
national programs and organizations.
• Enhanced engagement and uptake of climate
information in government and private sectors at
national, district, county, sub-county, parish and
village levels.
• Facilitation of improved funding for climate ser-
vices and technological resources and infrastruc-
ture. These limit the development of climate resi-
lience in East Africa, with a self-sustaining cycle
between poor support for climate research and ser-
vices and the inability of climate service providers
to meet stakeholder needs (Semazzi 2011). The
FCCP Framework could include specific actions to
advocate for greater support.
• Delivery of customized solutions to stakeholders
that involve a more diverse spectrum of sectors,
including entertainment (music, arts, theatre and
cinema), media (newspapers, TV and radio); edu-
cation (schools, technical colleges and universit-
ies); civil society (religion, cultural institutions,
tribal and clan activities), and military services.
At the GHACOF, participants were primarily
meteorologists and climate scientists, with many
seeing the FCCP Framework as their first opportunity
to analyse specific links between climate and sectoral
policy. However, in the absence of sector special-
ists in, say, agriculture or water, they acknowledged
that much of their policy discussion was poorly
informed. Nonetheless, these scientists demonstrated
high engagement, with enthusiasm to communic-
ate their science to a ‘real audience’ of users. As
above, they were also inspired to take the FCCP
Framework approach into a much broader inter-
disciplinary environment, recognising this as a critical
next step. In contrast, the Uganda meeting involved a
much broader mix of experts, allowing participants
to perhaps better sharpen the quality of their policy
recommendations, but unfortunately they lacked the
considerable time required to fully develop these.
In both cases, feedback was positive that the
approach provides a clear and systematic way of (i)
identifying the relevant stakeholders for more in-
depth planning, (ii) identifying initial key messages
for policy makers, (iii) linking actions from seasonal
to multi-decadal timescales, and regional to village
governance scales, that provides a means to effect-
ively engage the full breadth of diverse stakehold-
ers, and (iv) widening appreciation of the role of
climate change information in diverse policy plan-
ning and development decisions. The next step will
be to take these early results and discussions into
more detailed dialogue and policy formulation with
sector specialists. It is clear that this type of high-
level engagement would have to be supported by
more detailed and in depth planning processes, likely
using more established and sophisticated tools (for
examples see Presont et al, 2011). However, what
came through from the experiences in East Africa is
that the FCCP Framework enables the conversation
to start—without the need for collecting extensive
detailed information or to understand a more com-
plex planning process.
5. Discussion and conclusion
Initial trials of the FCCP Framework has shown it
to be both popular and effective as a way of linking
climate science and the policy debate. Its use shows
promise as a way of initiating discussions that can
enable long-term climate change information to feed
effectively into the policy and planning process in
complex contexts (Wilkinson et al 2013). Another
potential use may be to check the validity and likely
effects of adaptation choices already beingmade, with
several participants noting the need to ensure change
has a real effect rather than enforcing current prac-
tices. The FCCP Framework approach acts as a ‘real-
ity check’ and enables entrenched views and prac-
tices to be challenged. Participants also appreciated
the straightforwardness of the approach.
One appeal of the FCCP Framework arises from
the fact that it is designed explicitly to make use of
information about the future climate in a form that is
already available. Several participants at the Uganda
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meeting observed that ‘uncertainty’ is often used as
an excuse for inaction, essentially camouflaging the
fact that while we do not know the exact details of
the changes in the climate, we do know that the cli-
mate will change (see Chadwick et al 2016). The use
of contrasting plausible futures—climate risk narrat-
ives or CRNs—as the basis for FCCPs was useful
in identifying ‘no regrets’ interventions that would
be effective whatever direction of change occurs in
the future. When combined with the ‘walking back’
approach this has the potential to generate a powerful
list of short-term interventions that can have a big-
ger impact on future resilience than would be the case
when planning works forwards from short- to long-
term. This seems important given the challenges that
conventional planning has had in generating vision-
ary plans for the future.
The availability of clear and concise climate
narratives undoubtedly facilitates this, as well as
providing an extremely useful and effective way of
communicating climate change uncertainty in East
Africa. However, considerable time and expertise was
required to carefully define the three CRNs (Burgin
et al 2020). In the absence of this, an alternative more
parsimonious approach might be to simply identify
three specific climate models: one that has the joint
most extreme wetting and least warming relative to
all available models (with these variables being com-
bined in either a quantitative or qualitative manner),
another that has the most extreme joint drying and
warming, and a third that sits closest to the multi-
model mean. These could then be used to generate
CRNs, that could then form the basis of FCCP Frame-
work planning.
The FCCP Framework was originally developed
as a workshop approach to initiate discussion
between climate scientists and impact scientists in
the HyCRISTAL project. However, feedback sug-
gests it has greater scope and it does seem that this
type of long-term to short-term planning frame-
work has promise. In particular the response of
climate scientists and National Met Service staff
was extremely encouraging; the FCCP Framework
appears to help make the link between their work
and impact on current policy. This new approach
will help in the mapping of climate services deliver-
ables on long-term national development policy tar-
gets (e.g. NDPII 2015) in the GHA region and other
countries.
Naturally the frameworks are not sufficient to
support detailed sectoral planning, but there is poten-
tial to use them to provide an ‘anchoring’ for more
dynamic adaptive pathway planning exercises. The
complex reality of planning within challenging polit-
ical environments, and with multiple dynamic pro-
cesses working together, means that no single ‘act
of planning’ can be sufficient, what is needed ulti-
mately is an interlocked dynamic planning processes.
As Wiebe et al, observe in their 2018 review ‘scenario
development, quantitative modelling, and scenario-
guided design of policies and programs, play a key
role in exploring options to address socioeconomic
and environmental challenges across many sectors’.
The FCCP Framework shows promise as a useful
starting point for such detailed sectoral planning, and
critically may unlock some of the policy paralysis that
is often brought on when sector policy makers are
confrontedwith climate change information. The real
challenge, as many have found before, is to find the
institutional ‘home’ that can act as a long-term host
for such innovative, responsive long-term planning.
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